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Under the direction of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, the U.S.
Congress proposed a crop insurance program for the Bristol Bay, Alaska,
commercial salmon fishery. This study examines the feasibility of extending crop
insurance to this commercial fishery. The specific focus of this analysis is on
differences between this commercial capture fishery and agricultural enterprises
in the context of property rights and producer control. Findings show that differ-
ences between this commercial fishery and agricultural enterprises would require
substantial modifications to existing crop insurance programs. Furthermore, it is
recommended that the consideration of extending crop insurance be delayed until
this fishery is rationalized.
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In light of recent poor fishing seasons in western Alaska from 1997 through 1999,
and at the request of the U.S. Congress, the Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has proposed a pilot risk insurance program
for wild salmon in Alaska. This request occurred through the enactment of the Agri-
cultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, which directed the USDA’s Risk Management
Agency to develop and implement a pilot risk management program for the Bristol
Bay commercial salmon fishery. This was the first time a USDA crop insurance
program had been considered for a capture fishery.
Joshua A. Greenberg is associate professor, Department of Resources Management; Mark Herrmann is professor,
Department of Economics; Hans Geier is research associate, Department of Resources Management; and Charles
Hamel is research associate, Department of Economics, all at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks.
This paper is based on a report prepared by the authors for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, sponsored research
Working Paper No. 03.01.090158. The authors appreciate the assistance of Jay Garner of the Risk Management
Agency, and John Hilsinger, former regional supervisor of commercial fisheries at the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game. We also express our appreciation to all who attended and contributed at public meetings and those who
commented on the public review draft of the earlier document. The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments. All comments and expressed opinions in this paper are the authors’, and do not necessarily reflect
the positions of the USDA/RMA or the University of Alaska.176   Fall 2004 Journal of Agribusiness
1  Commercial fishery refers here to wild capture fishery, and is distinct from aquaculture enterprises.
The extension of a federal agricultural program to a commercial fishery may
appear appropriate given similarities between the two industries.
1 Both fishing and
farming represent natural resource based industries where resource productivity is
affected not only by the choices of producers but also by numerous biophysical
factors that are largely exogenous to producers. However, there are critical differ-
ences between these natural resource industries which need to be considered in an
application of farm programs to commercial fisheries. For example, commercial fish-
eries often occur in complex ecosystems where factors affecting fishery productivity
are not well documented or understood and are difficult to anticipate in advance.
Also, unlike farmers who are able to increase area-wide farm production through
employment of new technologies and prudent farming practices, fishermen in
regulated, open-access commercial fisheries compete for a fixed harvest quota set
by fishery managers in accordance with the overriding goal of stock protection.
While coordinated efforts of the agriculture industry and technological advances can
increase the overall production of farming, “in regulated, open-access fisheries,
operators take control by adopting technology which facilitates winning the ‘chase
for fish’...” (Anderson, 2002, p. 140). Accordingly, increased effort at the individual
level does not affect industry-wide gains in production for capture fisheries.
This study focuses on the proposed extension of crop insurance programs to the
Bristol Bay commercial sockeye salmon fishery by examining its structure and
focusing on key characteristics that distinguish operations in this commercial fishery
from those occurring in an agricultural setting. We examine the extent to which
these differences can be accommodated in a proposed commercial fishery risk
insurance program. Specifically, the concepts of producer control and property rights
are utilized to examine three key elements of federal crop insurance—the definitions
of peril, adverse selection, and moral hazard—in evaluating the feasibility of this
farm program to the Bristol Bay commercial salmon fishery.
It should be noted that despite being directed by the Agricultural Risk Protection
Act of 2000 to develop and implement a pilot risk management program for the
Bristol Bay commercial salmon fishery, the RMA declined to introduce the program,
and the Bristol Bay risk insurance program never proceeded beyond the initial
feasibility study. This decision to abort the program prior to program design and
implementation occurred despite considerable Congressional support and a federal
appropriation which would have funded the pilot program. (The findings reported
here may provide some clarification for the reasoning behind this decision.)
Industry Background
The Bristol Bay fishery occurs in the southeast portion of the Bering Sea, an area
located in southwestern Alaska (figure 1). There are five large, geographically remote
and dispersed fishing districts. The two principal staging areas for the fishery are the
towns of Dillingham and Naknek, located over 300 miles from Anchorage, Alaska.Greenberg et al. Application of Farm Programs to Commercial Fisheries   177
2  Since 1990, the Bristol Bay sockeye salmon harvest comprised over 95.4% of total Bristol Bay salmon harvest
by weight and 98.5% by value (Herrmann et al., 2004).
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Figure 1. The five fishing districts of the Bristol Bay commercial
salmon fishery
Most of the Bristol Bay commercial salmon fishing occurs in the months of June and
July. Fishery harvest principally occurs in a two- to three-week period between the
third week of June and mid-July. In the Bristol Bay fishery, unlike most other Alaska
salmon fisheries, there is a single dominant species, sockeye.
2
Bristol Bay is home to the largest sockeye salmon fishery in the world. For many
years, the Bristol Bay sockeye fishery was also lucrative for its participants. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, during the height of the fishery, gross exvessel earnings
exceeded $200 million. Prices paid to the fishermen (exvessel prices) peaked at
$1.86/pound. This is in stark contrast to recent fishery performance, where landings,
prices, and permit values have been in a steep decline. The 2001 and 2002 exvessel
prices of $0.40/pound and $0.43/pound are the lowest since limited entry despite
very weak runs. The estimated gross values of the 2001 and 2002 seasons were only
$34 and $29 million, respectively [Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
(CFEC), 2003a,b]. The 2001 season was so poor that for the first time in history, a
significant number of the Bristol Bay permit holders did not fish. Even fewer fishers
participated in 2002. Industry consensus is that there is no price relief forthcoming
in the near future.
The State of Alaska manages salmon fisheries under a limited-entry system, requir-
ing harvesters to obtain region-specific permits for the areas in which they wish to178   Fall 2004 Journal of Agribusiness
3  For an application of risk insurance to the set gill net sector, the interested reader is referred to Greenberg et al.
(2001).
participate. While the permits convey a participation right and therefore limit the
total number of participants, they do not allocate harvest, either by number, weight,
or percentage, among permit holders as in the case of other fisheries managed under
individual transferable quota programs (ITQs—such as the Alaska halibut and sable-
fish fisheries where percentage of total allowable quotas is allocated by a market
mechanism).
There are two permit types in Bristol Bay, those that permit harvest by drift gill
net and those that permit harvest by set gill net. The permits are transferable with
certain restrictions, and an active market in Bristol Bay salmon permits has
developed. Until 2001, the total number of permits for both segments of the fishery
(drift net and set net) had been fairly constant throughout the years. However, permit
prices have been highly variable, and severely depressed in recent years due to the
poor economic performance of the fishery. For example, the drift gill net permit price
peaked at $249,000 in 1989, but reached an all time low of just over $19,000 in 2002
(Alaska CFEC, 2003a; see figure 2).
Recent average gross revenues would have been even lower had many permit
holders decided not to fish. The 2001 and 2002 seasons were the first since the
advent of limited entry when many permit holders did not participate in the fishery.
In 2002, only 63% of the Bristol Bay drift net salmon permit holders fished their
permits (65% of set net permits), a record low level in the 24-year history of the
limited-entry fishery [Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), 2003; Alaska
CFEC, 2003a]. The simultaneous occurrences of low landings and low exvessel
price, as shown in figure 3, has led to back-to-back disaster declarations in western
Alaska by the State of Alaska.
Today’s Bristol Bay (and Alaska) salmon economic problems are extensive and
not likely to improve anytime soon (Herrmann, 2002). Alaska sockeye exvessel
prices are now largely unresponsive to harvest volume because of the domination
of world salmon markets from farmed salmon production. With the dominance of
farmed salmon well entrenched, increases in sockeye exvessel prices should not be
expected to mitigate revenue decreases from poor landings.
The two Bristol Bay permit groups, drift net and set net, form two distinct
harvesting sectors. Drift netters, in general, are able to fish in any of Bristol Bay’s
five districts. They will frequently change districts in-season, seeking the best
fishing opportunities. In contrast, set net harvesters are tied to a specific geographic
site both intra- and inter-seasonally. Set netters typically lease sites from the State
that specify the geographic boundaries within which they have exclusive fishing
rights. Set nets are set from shore, and captured fish are retrieved using small skiffs.
Typical drift net operations are significantly more productive than typical set net
operations, and the drift net fleet has historically accounted for 80%S90% of the
bay-wide catch. Given its prominence, the drift net harvesting sector will be the
focus of this analysis.
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The management goal for the Alaska salmon fisheries is to allow a proportion of
a given salmon run to escape capture that is consistent with achieving the desired
sustainable yield. Any salmon in excess of the desired escapement goal is then allo-
cated to the commercial, sports, subsistence, and personal use fisheries. To achieve
the escapement goal, Bristol Bay managers limit the amount of time the fishery is
open. Fishery openers for as little as six hours may be staggered throughout the
week, as sockeye runs first arrive in Bristol Bay. As salmon escapement moves
closer to the desired target, fishery openers may be lengthened. Fishery managers
also utilize various input controls to limit fleet fishing power. Among the most
notable controls are a 32-foot size limit on vessel length, and limits on net length and
mesh size. Also, harvesting methods other than drift and set nets are banned from the
commercial fishery.
Drift net harvesters have responded to the regulatory requirements and extreme
conditions of Bristol Bay by developing a highly specialized fleet of fishing boats.
Harvesters have compensated for the 32-foot vessel size restriction, potentially
limiting fish hold capacity, by building unusually wide vessels or cutting away the
bow of their existing vessel. These modifications compromise vessel speed and
maneuverability. Bristol Bay vessels are also built with shallow drafts. This design
feature accommodates the area’s severe tidal fluctuations which frequently require
boats to fish in shallow waters. The reduced stability of Bristol Bay salmon vessels
makes them unsuitable for open-sea travel beyond Bristol Bay. Accordingly, vessels
are dry-docked in the boatyards of Naknek and Dillingham during the off-season
(some harvesters also participate in Bristol Bay herring fisheries).
The purchase and maintenance costs of a competitive Bristol Bay salmon boat
dwarf drift net vessels in other Alaska salmon fisheries, making these among the
most expensive commercial fishing craft for their size. There is a high variation in
vessel costs, reflecting differences in hull type, engine type, gear, electronics, and
hydraulics. A top-of-the-line fully outfitted aluminum vessel may cost well in excess
of $150,000. Alternatively, a lower performing fully outfitted vessel can be purchased
for under $40,000.
Agriculture versus Commercial Fisheries
Under the auspices of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2002, the U.S.
Congress requested that crop insurance be extended to the Bristol Bay commercial
salmon fishery. If adopted, it would have represented the first extension of USDA
agricultural support programs to a commercial fishery. Crop insurance has become
one of the principal federal programs for U.S. agricultural producers. The USDA’s
Risk Management Agency in 1999 provided crop insurance for over 100 crops, with
1.85 million policies for crops valued at $31 billion and covering 194 million acres.
In 2003, the program was projected to provide $38 billion in risk protection for
approximately 208 million acres representing more than 100 crops, or 80% of the
nation’s planted acres for principal crops (Davidson, 2003; USDA/RMA, 2003).Greenberg et al. Application of Farm Programs to Commercial Fisheries   181
As noted earlier, the concept of applying agricultural programs to commercial
fisheries may appear to be a natural extension of federal assistance. Both agriculture
and commercial fisheries are primary industries. Producers in both industries are
subject to high risks associated with production vulnerabilities from environmental
conditions and biophysical parameters that are beyond the control of the producers.
Accordingly, enterprises in both agricultural and fishery settings can experience
wide earning fluctuations caused, in part, by production variability that is exogenous
to the producer. Finally, production failures from natural events in both settings
commonly affect producers throughout entire geographic regions, rather than being
restricted to a specific firm(s).
Nevertheless, there are important differences between agricultural and commercial
fishery settings that serve to distinguish these two natural resource based industries.
In comparing commercial fisheries and aquaculture enterprises, Asche and Tveteras
(2002) and Anderson (2002) provide a useful framework for examining these differ-
ences which can be extended to our analysis of risk insurance programs in Bristol
Bay. Anderson points to property rights as the mechanism conferring varying
degrees of control on what, where, when, and how much is produced. As property
rights increase, the degree of control increases. Anderson notes there is not a clear
distinction between aquaculture and wild fisheries with respect to property rights,
but rather, the difference exists in accordance with the amount of control held by
individuals, groups, communities, and cooperatives over the fishery. While aqua-
culture ventures, similar to other agricultural enterprises, commonly have
considerable control over production, market development, costs, innovations, and
investment, some capture fisheries have developed an institutional framework that
has led to some degree of property rights. Capture fisheries with a higher degree of
property rights (though still lower than most aquaculture ventures) include those
organized under individual transferable quotas and cooperatives. Salmon ranching
fisheries including cost-recovery hatcheries have a higher degree of property rights
than those fisheries with no production control.
In contrast, relatively weak property rights and lack of producer control over
production characterize Alaska’s salmon fisheries. Weak producer control is evident
in the fishery’s performance in an index constructed by Anderson (2002) in which
aquaculture and capture fisheries are positioned on opposite ends of a spectrum. The
index is composed of the following five factors: (a) dependence on wild fish stock
for brood stock or juveniles, (b) degree of dependence on wild fish stock for feed,
(c) degree of confinement, (d) degree of control of the environment/habitat, and
(e) degree of harvest and market management. The Bristol Bay sockeye run size is
determined by factors exogenous to producers. The fish stocks are completely
dependent on wild feed sources exogenous to producers. The fishery resource is
unconfined throughout its life cycle. There is very little control over the sockeye’s
environment. Finally, harvesters have almost no control over the timing of harvest
and sale of raw product.
As noted above, federal crop insurance to date has been available only in agri-
cultural settings, including limited applications to aquaculture where producers have182   Fall 2004 Journal of Agribusiness
considerable control over production as conveyed by the opportunities for strong
property rights. However, the characteristics of the Alaska salmon fisheries have
particular implication relative to several of the conditions of insurability which may
interfere with the application of crop insurance in this commercial fishery setting.
As reported by Rejda (2001), the conditions for risk to be insurable are: (a) there
must be numerous exposure units, (b) the loss is accidental and unintentional, (c) the
loss must be determinable and measurable, (d) the loss should not be catastrophic,
(e) the chance of loss must be calculable, and (f ) the premium must be economically
feasible. In the remainder of this paper, we apply the concepts of property rights and
producer control to evaluate the insurability of risk in the Bristol Bay salmon fishery
through three key elements of federal crop insurance—the definitions of peril,
adverse selection, and moral hazard.
Peril
A starting point for our discussion is the concept of peril. Peril is defined here as an
event or element that introduces risk into the production process. The types of insured
perils for agriculture vary by crop insurance program, but commonly include the
following:
(a) adverse weather conditions; (b) fire; (c) insects, but exclusive of damages due to
improper/inadequate pest control measures; (d) plant disease, but not damage due to
improper/inadequate plant care measures; (e) wildlife; (f) earthquake; (g) volcanic
eruption, or (h) failure of the irrigation water supply if due to an unavoidable cause of
loss occurring within the insurance period [Frerichs, 2001, online].
As revealed by an examination of the above list, peril has been defined as a
specific set of unanticipated/unavoidable events which affect some outcome, such
as low yields. This definition of peril acknowledges that despite considerable
producer control over production, there are events beyond the producer’s control
which will occur periodically and lead to production failures (often affecting all
producers in a region). In this definition of peril, it is assumed these events outside
of producers’ control can be readily distinguished from those events producers could
avoid if “best farming practices” are followed. The set of “best farming practices,”
as specified in crop insurance programs, represents agreements between producers
and insurers with respect to specific production practices a prudent farmer would
follow.
This approach to defining peril must be altered in the case of the Bristol Bay
commercial salmon fishery due to producers having weak production control. In the
case of this fishery (and many commercial fisheries), it is difficult (or perhaps
impossible) to determine the contribution of various natural factors and harvester-
induced factors to both fishery-wide and harvester-specific performance. Numerous
natural events may influence run strength at various temporal points from when
salmon hatch, through their migration, and when they return to Bristol Bay three to
four years later. Insufficient information is available to assign specific impacts toGreenberg et al. Application of Farm Programs to Commercial Fisheries   183
these various factors. Furthermore, the salmon population is not confined, and is
unobserved except upon its return to Bristol Bay.
It is even more problematic to link the behaviors of individual fishermen to fishing
performance. Similar practices among individual farmers in a given county would
be expected to yield similar rates of productivity, ceteris paribus. Furthermore,
changes in productivity of one agricultural producer do not affect the productivity
of other agricultural producers. However, in Bristol Bay, the zero-sum nature of
commercial fishing results in an added element of divisibility in production and a
further weakening of producer control: each fish of the total allowable catch harvested
by fisherman A is one less fish available for capture by fishermen B and C. Here,
even if we were to assume homogeneity in capital and skill levels, a disproportionate
distribution of productivity among individual fishers would still be expected, favoring
those who happen to reach the fish first. The open-access nature of the resource and
the absence of nonattenuated property rights lead to a direct interdependency between
fishermen performance that would not otherwise be present.
When other sources of variability, such as skill level, are added to the natural
variability inherent in the race for fish, it is easier to understand the variability in
fishing performance that exists across drift net fishermen in Bristol Bay (table 1).
For example, in 1999, the mean harvest for the drift net fleet was 61,000 pounds,
with a standard deviation in excess of 26,000 pounds and coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by the mean) of 44%. Historically (between 1980 and
1999), the coefficient of variation ranged between 40% and 80%, with a mean of
54%. The heavy reliance on a biological determined fish run contrasts with the typi-
cal agricultural scenario in which a guideline set of prudent and enforceable farming
practices is expected to result in more similar yields across individual farmers,
holding all other variables constant.
In addition to the problematic nature of determining the cause of an individual
harvest failure, the insurance of an outcome rather than an event has other important
implications in the design of a commercial fishery risk insurance program. In typical
agriculture crop insurance programs, occurrences of the defined perils are largely
independent events across time. For example, a flood in county x in year y is likely
not to change the probability of hail in county x in year y+1. However, salmon run
sizes across time are not independent events, but rather biological outcomes that are
linked together by common biological responses to shared phenomena or events. For
instance, a water temperature event (a change in water temperature from the norm)
may affect siblings within a cohort that return in different years and/or affect sock-
eye populations across several cohorts.
From the perspective of a risk insurance program, the key issue is whether this
correlation can be exploited by the potential insurance purchasers (the producers)
to successfully determine whether the upcoming season’s fishery performance will
be above or below historical fishery performance (harvest in the case of a produc-
tion-based program and revenue in a revenue-based program), and hence whether
there is a good chance an insurable event will occur. Fishermen may form an expec-
tation of the upcoming season’s performance based on their knowledge of recent184   Fall 2004 Journal of Agribusiness
























1980 132,998,302  74,844  69,862 41,765 56%
1981 148,570,193  82,769  76,649 43,568 53%
1982 101,319,801  56,446  44,072 44,065 78%
1983 203,045,585 112,678 108,193  53,353 47%
1984 150,277,450  83,072  78,986 44,323 53%
1985 131,460,701  68,900  61,433 44,959 65%
1986   91,578,350  49,798  47,935 28,060 56%
1988   87,989,905  47,614  42,249 23,720 50%
1989 149,107,543  79,865  75,867 34,050 43%
1990 175,491,384  93,446  88,829 40,358 43%
1991 136,433,355  72,111  63,658 39,857 55%
1992 167,624,605  88,597  78,581 47,146 53%
1993 218,385,808 116,101 109,841  51,283 44%
1994 180,890,003  95,658  90,972 44,851 47%
1995 218,591,747 111,356 104,564  53,768 48%
1996 166,867,213  88,057  83,056 35,538 40%
1997   62,776,331  33,338  30,166 26,634 80%
1998   51,133,668  27,418  25,663 18,517 68%
1999 113,887,423  61,131  57,980 26,619 44%
Average 141,496,282  75,958  70,450 39,075 54%
Source: Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 2003b.
a No statistics are provided for 1987 because the individual catch data were considered unreliable for this year.
fishery history or on forecasts derived from more complex fishery modeling such as
those provided by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) and the
Fishery Research Institute, University of Washington (FRI-UW). If potential insur-
ance purchasers, such as fishermen, have a good ability to predict the relative strength
of the upcoming season vis-à-vis historical fishery performance, then it should be
expected they would commonly adopt a strategy of purchasing insurance only in
those years considered likely to qualify as disasters. This point is discussed in greater
detail in the context of adverse selection, below.
Adverse Selection (Against the Insurance Provider)
Adverse selection generally exists when the insured party has better knowledge of
the relative risk of a particular situation than does the insurance provider. The
relevance of this issue to a Bristol Bay risk insurance program was raised in the prior
section where peril, due to weak producer control over total fishery output and indi-
vidual harvests, was defined as an outcome—fishery harvest. Since fishery harvestGreenberg et al. Application of Farm Programs to Commercial Fisheries   185
is dependent on run strength, which may be correlated and predictable over time,
fishermen may be able to successfully anticipate when an insurable event will occur.
In our case then, adverse selection refers to the potential ability of fishermen to “out-
guess the insurance policy,” i.e., adopt a strategy of purchasing insurance only when
there is a good chance of insurance payout. This strategy would severely compromise
the ability to implement an actuarially sound insurance program. Under these circum-
stances, participation in the insurance program would be expected to be low in those
years when it is unlikely an insurable event would occur, and high when poor
seasons are probable. Consequently, the insurance provider would be faced with the
daunting challenge of developing a program whereby receipts in nondisaster years
are sufficient to offset payouts from years in which insurable events do occur.
Fishermen may base their expectation of future harvest on factors such as their
own past harvest history or readily available preseason forecasts of run size and har-
vest levels from ADF&G and FRI-UW. Both the ADF&G and FRI-UW preseason
forecasts have been highly errant in the past, and the errors appear to have a strong
unsystematic component. This is not unexpected, given the limited understanding
of salmon population dynamics and the numerous potential influences on run strength
for which data are unavailable or incomplete. For example, between 1990 and 2001,
the percentage deviation between actual run size and the ADF&G and FRI-UW
forecasts ranged from !106% to +56%, and from !135% to +43%, respectively
(table 2). Despite the inaccuracies, fishermen and processors utilize these forecasts
as planning tools in making large capital investment decisions.
Although forecasts are highly errant, this does not diminish their potential role for
aiding fishermen in “outguessing the insurance.” A more important consideration
within the context of risk insurance is whether a fisherman can predict if harvest (or
revenue) levels will be better or worse than normal for the upcoming season. Typi-
cally, in crop insurance programs, expected production is defined as an average of
historic production. The time periods included in this calculation vary across pro-
grams, and various types of averages are employed. Expected production, however
it is defined, serves as the benchmark to which current year performance is compared
in the determination of whether an insurable event is triggered. Accordingly, with
respect to a risk insurance program, it is not important to harvesters that they be able
to predict the absolute value of the upcoming season’s harvest (or revenue). Rather,
it is sufficient to simply predict whether production in the upcoming season will be
greater or less than the expected level adjusted by the chosen coverage level, as
defined in the insurance program. This is a much less rigorous requirement of the
fishery forecast than predicting the absolute value of next season’s production.
These predictions become the relevant concern to harvesters, particularly if they
have chosen a 100% coverage level.
Similar analyses could be calculated to provide measures of the forecasts’ success
for various coverage levels. Table 3 presents a comparison of the success of the
ADF&G and FRI-UW forecasts as well as a naïve forecast in predicting whether
harvest will exceed expected harvest. The naïve forecast represents the upcoming
season’s harvest as equal to that of the previous season. This latter forecast is included186   Fall 2004 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 2. ADF&G and FRI-UW Forecasts of Harvestable Bristol Bay Sockeye
and Actual Run Size, 1985S S S S2001 (million fish)



























 1985 23.7 20.3 !3.4 !14.3%    — — —
 1986 15.8 13.3 !2.5 !15.8%    — — —
 1987 16.1   9.3 !6.8 !42.2%    12.4 !3.7 !12.0%  
 1988 14.0 16.8 2.8 20.0%    20.8 6.8 48.6%  
 1989 28.7 16.2 !12.5 !43.6%    25.4 !3.3 !11.5%  
 1990 33.5 14.7 !18.8 !56.1%    19.0 !14.5 !43.3%  
 1991 25.8 21.2 !4.6 !17.8%    25.0 !0.8 !3.1%  
 1992 31.9 26.3 !5.6 !17.6%    22.0 !9.9 !31.0%  
 1993 40.5 32.0 !8.5 !21.0%    31.9 !8.6 !21.2%  
 1994 35.6 39.6 4.0 11.2%    34.1 !1.5 !4.2%  
 1995 44.4 40.3 !4.1 !9.2%    34.4 !10.0 !22.5%  
 1996 29.7 34.6 4.9 16.5%    33.4 3.7 12.5%  
 1997 12.2 24.8 12.6 103.3%    25.4 13.2 108.2%  
 1998 10.0 20.6 10.6 106.0%    23.5 13.5 135.0%  
 1999 26.1 13.8 !12.3 !47.1%    21.2 !4.9 !18.8%  
 2000 20.5 22.3 1.8 8.8%    24.4 3.9 19.0%  
 2001 14.0 15.6 1.6 11.4%    13.8 !0.2 !1.4%  
Sources: Rogers et al., 1991; Rogers, Lew, and Hilborn, 2000.
Table 3. Percentage of Time the ADF&G, FRI-UW, and Naïve Forecasts Cor-
rectly Predicted Whether a Harvest Will Be Less Than or Greater Than the








ADF&G 73% 73% 91%
FRI-UW 80% 80% 91%
Naïve
 a 73% 87% 91%
a Naïve forecasts for 4-year average harvest are for 1983S2001, for 8-year average harvest are for 1987S2001, and
for 12-year average harvest are for 1991S2001.
because recent fishery performance provides another indicator to fishery participants
of what to expect in the coming season. Three alternative expected harvests are
examined in table 3, representing normal harvests defined as simple 4-, 8-, and 12-
year averages of historic harvests.
Even if a forecast has no predictive power, it should, on average, correctly predict
whether harvest would be above or below the calculated normal harvest approxi-
mately 50% of the time in repeated samples. Inspection of table 3 reveals that eachGreenberg et al. Application of Farm Programs to Commercial Fisheries   187
4  We are not suggesting here that the naïve forecast is as useful as the ADF&G and FRI-UW forecasts. In contrast
to these other two forecasts, a naïve forecast will never foresee turning points and is of little value in projecting the
longer run outlook for the fishery.
of the forecasts significantly exceeds this level of predictive power. The ADF&G,
FRI-UW, and naïve forecasts successfully predict 91% of the time the relative posi-
tion of next season’s harvest in comparison to the 12-year average harvest. As would
be expected, the predictive powers of the forecasts are diminished as the time period
used in calculating normal harvest is shortened. Nevertheless, the forecasts continue
to display significant predictive powers. The success rates in the case of an 8-year
simple average are 73%, 80%, and 87% for the ADF&G, FRI-UW, and naïve fore-
casts, respectively. Similarly, in the case of a normal harvest based on a 4-year
average, the success rates are 73% for the ADF&G and naïve forecasts and 80% for
the FRI-UW forecast. A surprising outcome is that the naïve forecast performs com-
parably well to the ADF&G and FRI-UW forecasts in predicting whether harvest
will exceed expected harvest.
4
The potential problems in delivery of an insurance program caused by the availa-
bility of ADF&G and FRI-UW forecasts could be offset by requiring that the insurance
purchase occur prior to the forecasts’ public release dates. However, the predictive
power of the naïve forecast is more problematic. This forecast (or some variant of the
naïve forecast presented here) can easily be derived by fishery participants. Fishery
participants are well aware of their collective performance history, and would be ex-
pected to apply this knowledge in forming their risk insurance purchasing strategy.
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard for agriculture is defined here as an action taken by producers to maxi-
mize joint returns from the insurance product and productive activities by limiting
their production of the insured crop. There are numerous potential moral hazards in
commercial fisheries. Principal concerns in evaluating moral hazards specifically
revolve around (a) introducing incentives for harvesters to “fish” the insurance, and
(b) creating major structural changes to the way the fishery operates.
It is common in the discussion of agricultural risk insurance programs to refer to
the potential problem of farmers “farming” the insurance. In point (a) above, we
adapt this term to the commercial fisheries. For either farmers or fishermen, this
refers to the case where the producers can increase their return by organizing their
activities toward maximizing joint returns from the insurance product and productive
activities. One obvious application to the commercial fisheries would be a harvester
who decreases fishing effort in anticipation of insurance payouts exceeding any
decline in harvesting revenue. For example, in the case where an insurance trigger
is based on an individual harvester’s historic average performance, a harvester could
restrict effort in order to trigger insurance payout. In the Bristol Bay salmon fishery,
this could take the form of participating in fewer fishery openers or even limiting the
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of the commercial fishery, the setting in which the fishery occurs, and the wide
divergence in vessels and vessel performance, it would be very difficult to develop
an enforceable mechanism for identifying these types of practices as the cause of
poor performance. Accordingly, in this setting, asymmetric information is a promi-
nent feature whereby it would be difficult for the insurer to uncover all of the actions
of the harvester, and only the harvester knows the actual motives for his or her
fishing actions and whether any particular action is inconsistent with best fishery
practices.
This discussion underscores two basic problems in applying crop insurance to
commercial fisheries. As noted, it is virtually impossible to precisely identify the
causes of weak fishery runs. The population dynamics of anadromous fish stocks are
generally poorly understood. Furthermore, data on contributing factors are frequently
lacking or incomplete. This greatly compromises the ability to accurately estimate
the average frequency and severity of future fishery losses.
Second, unlike agriculture, it is difficult to conceive of a set of “best practices”
that would be required of harvesters. This is a consequence of commercial fishing
and agriculture occurring within very different institutional and competitive settings.
In agriculture, a farmer applies productive inputs to land either owned or leased and
has exclusive rights to all associated output. In contrast, regulated, open-access
fisheries are prosecuted under a competitive, but zero-sum setting. Harvesters do not
own fish until capture, and engage in an inefficient race against one another to catch
the seasonal allocation. The suboptimal performance of derby-style fisheries is the
primary impetus for rationalization efforts in fisheries management. There are
numerous strategic decisions harvesters make in regulated open-access which are
behaviorally related to an absence of nonattenuated property rights. They must try
to anticipate the response of all other harvesters in planning their own harvesting
strategy. They must also anticipate what the run size will be in various locations and
at various times. For example, the determination of where and when to participate
is going to depend on a harvester’s assessment of run strengths at various locations
and the number of other participating vessels. It may be reasonable for harvesters to
opt out of participating in a given fishing period, or to choose one location to fish
over another, even if in hindsight these decisions turn out to be incorrect. Further-
more, harvesters’ actions are constrained by fishery managers who control where
and when fishing will be allowed and which productive inputs may be employed.
Given weak producer control over harvest and the absence of nonattenuated property
rights, we are uncertain how an insurance provider would determine the true
motivation for a particular action by a harvester and differentiate between those
activities which, from an insurance standpoint, are considered legitimate, and those
that are not.
The second moral hazard refers to the possibility that introduction of the crop
insurance program will be detrimental to the industry. Introduction of a risk insurance
program could encourage fishery participation by harvesters who otherwise would
have remained idle for a given season. Such an outcome in the Bristol Bay commer-
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managers, or the State of Alaska. In fact, it is exactly the type of behavior that should
be discouraged from the standpoint of economic efficiency. The Bristol Bay com-
mercial salmon fishery, like so many other regulated open-access fisheries worldwide,
suffers from overcapitalization with too many boats chasing too few fish. Histor-
ically, encouraging additional participation to the fishery would not have been of
concern. A cap on the total number of fishery participants is set by the limited-entry
system, and this cap was achieved year-in and year-out, through the 2000 season, as
virtually every permit was fished (the sole exception was 1991, when fishermen
engaged in a work stoppage to protest low price offers from processors). However,
as noted earlier, in the 2001 and 2002 seasons, many permits in Bristol Bay were not
fished due to the combination of low expected harvests and exvessel prices. This
lower participation has a positive effect on efficiency by reducing overall fishing
costs, thereby increasing the average catch and net revenue of the remaining fleet.
This outcome helps offset the negative impacts of poor runs and/or prices to those
fishermen who choose to participate in the fishery.
A risk insurance program could interfere with logical reductions in participation in
years of low performance expectations. This is a consequence of fishery participation
being required to be eligible for indemnity payments, particularly in years which are
expected to qualify as a disaster. The incentive to participate would be further en-
hanced if permit holders believed that nonparticipation would be detrimental to their
historic catch and/or revenue history which is used to calculate future indemnity.
Discussion
In the consideration of extending the USDA crop insurance program to a wild
fishery, it is important to examine the significant differences between agriculture
(including aquaculture) and a capture fishery, and the implications of these differ-
ences for the insurability of the risk. Perhaps the most important difference arises
from the need to define the “peril” as an outcome, rather than an event. Given this
definition of peril, all instances of low harvests or low revenues, no matter what the
underlying reason, would become candidates for consideration as a disaster if the
insurance guarantee were based on individual performances. An obvious incentive
would be introduced for fishermen to attribute all harvest problems to an absence of
fish or other insurable causes when it may just be the random variation inherent in
the zero-sum nature of fishery landings. A commercial fishery equivalent to “best
agricultural practices” is not apparent for this fishery, and we do not foresee how a
loss adjuster could be employed at season’s end to determine the causes of low
catches and appropriately weight all possible contributing factors. In the absence of
having an observer onboard all relevant vessels (a very expensive proposition), it
would be difficult or impossible to appropriately separate out those claims that are
legitimate from those not deserving indemnification.
Because of these reasons, an insurable event in the Bristol Bay sockeye fishery
would have to be defined as a harvest failure on a group guarantee basis rather than
an individual basis. In typical crop insurance programs, a group guarantee basis is190   Fall 2004 Journal of Agribusiness
accompanied by a group indemnity basis. That is, the group’s harvest (or revenues)
is used to determine whether a disaster has occurred, and identical payouts to farmers
(on an acre basis) are based on a group’s “average farmer.” For example, under a
Group Risk Program (GRP), the guarantee and indemnity function is defined as:
(1) y g ' θy e ' θy AGH,
I ' max 0, (y g & y c)Pg ,
where y
g is the guaranteed yield that triggers the insurance, y
e is the expected yield,
y
AGH is the average production history for a group of producers (such as a county in
an agricultural setting), y
c is the group average yield, θ is the chosen coverage level,
I is the indemnity payment, and P
g is the guaranteed price. The guaranteed yield is
estimated based on past group yield histories (see Makki and Somwaru, 2001). In
the case of the Bristol Bay salmon fishery, harvest would replace yield as the rele-
vant production measure.
The above example may be appropriate in an agricultural setting where a guideline
set of prudent and enforceable farming practices is expected to result in similar yields
across individual farmers, holding all other variables constant, but it does not charac-
terize the Bristol Bay fishery where judgment, skill, experience, capitalization, labor
employment, and other factors contribute to extreme catch differentials even among
harvesters with similar fishing opportunities. In commercial fishery settings, it is
common for there to be a group of harvesters—referred to as highliners—who are
consistently much more productive than the rest of the fleet. The catch variability
among harvesters in Bristol Bay was previously reported in table 1, which provides the
coefficient of variation of vessel landings. This variability is further documented in
table 4, which shows that for the 1995S1999 period, both the most productive 5% and
10% of producers outperformed the fleet average by a ratio greater than 2:1. In con-
trast, the less productive producers significantly underperformed the fleet average. An
insurance product such as GRP, with a group indemnity, has been cited as being
unsuitable for producers whose production does not follow the group (county) yields
(Edward, 2003; Stokes et al., 1999). A GRP type program may be unattractive to the
more productive “highliners,” while being very attractive to low-end producers. This
outcome could severely compromise the ability to establish a successful insurance
program.
Accordingly, characteristics of the fishery would require consideration of a hybrid
risk insurance product that has a group guarantee basis and an individual indemnity
basis. Specifically, while a disaster is based on the entire group’s performance, pay-
outs are based on a producer’s past history. An example of one specification a hybrid
program could take is presented below:
(2) y g ' θy e ' θy AGH,
δ ' (y g & y c)/yg,
I ' max 0, δ(θy APH & y a)Pg ,Greenberg et al. Application of Farm Programs to Commercial Fisheries   191
Table 4. Bristol Bay Salmon Fishery Drift Net Harvest Performance Measures for
the Entire Fleet and for the Top 5%, Top 10%, and Lower 50% of the Fleet by
Landings (by permit)
























1999 93 186 932 1,863 126,159 113,689 40,788   61,131 10% 19% 33%
1998 94 187 933 1,865   63,290   54,725 17,410   27,418 12% 20% 32%
1997 94 188 942 1,883   96,602   83,279 13,805   33,338 14% 25% 21%
1996 95 190 948 1,895 178,516 160,253 60,829   88,057 10% 18% 35%
1995 98 196 982 1,963 255,397 223,746 72,284 111,356 11% 20% 32%
Source: Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 2003b.
where δ is the payment calculation factor, y
APH is average production history for a
producer, y
a is the actual producer’s yield, and all other variables are as previously
defined. In this case, an insurable disaster would be triggered only if the average
group yield were below the group-based guaranteed yield. However, the indemnity
payment would be based on both the percentage by which the group yield is under
the guaranteed yield (the payment calculation factor, δ) and the difference between
the individual producer’s yield and the producer’s average production history
adjusted by the chosen coverage level. Payment to a producer would occur only if
both the actual group yield falls below the average group production history adjusted
by the coverage level and the actual producer’s yield falls below the producer’s
average production history adjusted by the coverage level. [For a further discussion
of this hybrid program, see Greenberg et al. (2001).]
An additional modification may be necessary for a risk insurance product in
Bristol Bay to avoid the problem of adverse selection. Fishery harvests are dependent
on run strength, which is a biological phenomenon. Therefore, run strength over time
may be correlated, and to a certain extent predictable. As a result, fishermen may be
able to successfully anticipate whether an insurable event will occur in the coming
season, and thereby adopt a strategy of purchasing insurance only when insurable
events are likely. This would severely compromise an insurer’s ability to implement
an actuarially sound risk insurance program. One possible remedy would be to create
a multiple-year insurance product, whereby policyholders would agree to insure their
operation for consecutive periods.
Even with these program modifications, however, the question of the appropriate-
ness of risk insurance to this fishery remains. A major restructuring of the Alaska
salmon industry appears to be imminent. This risk insurance discussion is unfolding
against a backdrop of rationalization efforts in Alaska’s salmon fisheries following
successful management approaches to rationalize halibut, sablefish, and other ground-
fish, as well as similar ongoing efforts in the crab fisheries. As noted by Anderson
(2002), a fishery co-op was formed for the Chignik, Alaska, salmon fishery (a small-192   Fall 2004 Journal of Agribusiness
scale Alaska salmon fishery located off the Aleutian peninsula), providing producers
with greater production control. Similar measures are likely to be adopted in other
Alaska salmon fisheries over time. The objective of fishery rationalization is to rectify
problems caused by regulated, open-access treatment of the fishery resource through
respecification of property rights in a manner which provides greater producer
control over where, when, and how much is produced, and the timing of harvest. A
key feature of fishery rationalization is the reduction of competitive effort on the
fishing grounds. An important consideration of the extension of a risk insurance
program to a wild fishery such as the Bristol Bay area is whether the program would
interfere with the exit of capital from this oversubscribed fishery, and thereby seri-
ously harm fishery rationalization efforts. This concern alone casts serious doubt over
the merits of such a program.
Following the rationalization of the Alaska salmon fisheries, salmon harvesters
will have obtained a greater degree of property rights to fishery harvest and increased
producer control. At this point, many of the existing significant obstacles of the crop
insurance extension to the Bristol Bay, and other Alaska salmon fisheries, will have
been mitigated—although other obstacles may arise.
For example, should the rationalization process in the Bristol Bay salmon fishery
follow some form similar to that introduced in the Alaska halibut and sablefish
fisheries, then harvesters would be able to acquire transferable harvest quota shares.
Transferable quota shares represent a harvester right (privilege) to a certain percent-
age of total fishery harvest. The presence of transferable quota shares introduces into
the fishery a productive unit which, for insurance purposes, is in many ways
analogous to land in an agricultural setting. Harvesters, rather than being engaged
in a race-for-fish, are able to employ labor and capital so as to minimize the cost of
catching their assigned harvest share. Harvesters are able to adjust their production
by buying and selling quota shares rather than through the more uncertain process
of open competition on the fishing grounds.
The relevant production unit in the insurance setting would change from total
producer harvest to yield per unit of quota share, which is similar to the measure of
yield per acre found in agricultural crop insurance programs. The insurance product
could guarantee the harvester some historical average yield per quota share (adjusted
by coverage level), with the assumption that it is the responsibility of the harvesters
to catch the share of the total fishery harvest determined by their total quota shares.
This group-based average yield per quota share would be based on average produc-
tion history (APH), which would also serve as the basis for determining indemnity
payments. Since the insurance guarantee and indemnity are group based, it is no
longer important for the insurer to know all the actions undertaken by individual
harvesters, the motives for these actions, and whether these actions are consistent
with best fishery practices. This greatly mitigates problems caused by asymmetric
information, which were introduced in the discussion of moral hazard. A more tradi-
tional group-based risk insurance product could be employed in the fishery, such as
a GRP program.Greenberg et al. Application of Farm Programs to Commercial Fisheries   193
Consequently, it may be prudent after salmon rationalization has been implemented,
and the fishery under these conditions has matured, to revisit the idea of insuring the
Alaska salmon fishery. Nevertheless, even with these structural changes to fishery
management, major challenges remain in developing a risk insurance product for the
fishery. The assignment of property rights does not eliminate the potential for inter-
temporal adverse selection—although, as noted, this problem may be addressed by
requiring insurance buyers to purchase a multi-year product. More importantly, the
introduction of a property rights based management system into the fishery does not
improve producer control over total fishery harvest. Total fishery harvest remains
a function of total fishery run size, a biological event that is exogenous to producers.
Accordingly, peril would continue to be defined as an outcome, i.e., low fishery
harvest, rather than as a specific set of events.
The current array of risk management tools offered by the RMA relies upon basic
actuarial information in order to provide actuarially sound resources and programs.
In the case of the Bristol Bay commercial salmon fishery, acquiring this infor-
mation would be problematic since the population dynamics of wild salmon are
poorly understood. It is simply not possible to definitively identify the causes
of periodic run failures. In order to be effective, “crop insurance” programs, as
currently offered by the RMA, rely on probabilistic determination of the frequency
and severity of loss. Given the aforementioned fishery feature, it would be hard to
establish either of these factors to a degree of accuracy consistent with current RMA
requirements.
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